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Abstract 
 
Social objects originate from constitutive rules. But there are two ways of explain-
ing the relationship between them. I call them “Manifest Image” and “Deep Im-
age”. The former depends on Searle’s interpretation of social reality and it is 
based on collective intentionality; the latter is the one I support and it is based on 
documentality. Indeed, recordings and documents are sufficient to explain how 
and why social world exists. There is no need to use such a vague notion, as that 
of collective intentionality, in order to give a useful account of society. Docu-
ments can do it better, especially with the help of the process called emergence, as 
the case of money clearly shows. 
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1. Introduction 
Constitutive rules are rules that constitute social objects. For instance, the rules 
of tennis constitute the game of tennis, and the rules of the Italian constitution 
constitute Italy as a state. But constitutive rules do not arise from nothing. 
Where do they come from? According to Searle (1995 and 2010), constitutive 
rules are an outcome of collective intentionality. However, Searle himself 
acknowledges that collective intentionality in turn needs to rest on something 
non-intentional, which he calls “the Background”. Yet, as Rust (2009) pointed 
out, Searle finds it hard to explain what the Background really is and how it re-
ally works. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the Background limits itself to 
support collective intentionality or, instead, can produce social objects on its 
own (cf. Terrone and Tagliafico 2014). Finally, there might be other factors that 
ground social reality over and above collective intentionality and its Background 
(cf. Epstein 2015). 
In this paper, I will argue that there is a layer of recordings and documents 
that grounds constitutive rules and therefore social objects at a deeper level than 
that of collective intentionality. I will state that recordings and documents are 
the cornerstone of the empirical background that warrants the production of so-
cial objects through constitutive rules. In this sense, I will propose to move from 
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a “Manifest image”, i.e. a conception of social reality based on collective inten-
tionality, to a “Deep image”, i.e. a conception of social reality based on record-
ings and documents.  
There is nothing more wrong than the idea posited by Vico—and by many 
after him—that nature is obscure because it is God’s work, while society is 
transparent because it is man’s work. First of all, it is unclear where nature ends 
and society begins; secondly, most of us surely find it hard to conceive of our-
selves as the men who created society. In fact, our relationship with society is no 
different from our relationship with nature: that is, one of competence without 
understanding. If we throw a stone up in the air we move to dodge it even be-
fore learning the law of gravity, and we promise, we bet, and write wills based 
on vague, and often wrong, notions of law and society. If that is the case, there 
is nothing strange about the fact that we may often be surprised by social reality, 
which may reveal hidden aspects (after all, the surplus value was unknown to 
both capitalists and workers, as well as economists, until Marx discovered it). 
The structure of society is not transparent to its members any more than the 
structure of consciousness is transparent to its subject. The fact that those things 
are the closest to us is anything but an advantage: it’s rather a case of something 
being “a little too obvious”, like the purloined letter of Poe’s novel, which for 
that very reason escapes our observation and conscience. That is why, to answer 
the question (paradigmatic for social ontology) of what constitutes money, i.e. 
gives the value of money to a piece of paper, one cannot point to some evidence, 
but rather has to solve a riddle—or at least try to do so. One needs to rip a veil 
that hides the whole sphere of social normativity: What is a constitutive rule, i.e. 
what is the secular sacrament that transforms a human being into a doctor (au-
thorized to cure), a licence holder (authorized to drive), a recipient of a call-up 
paper or a payment order (required to show up to the barracks or to pay)? . In-
terestingly, in all these cases there is indeed a piece of paper involved—
although, of course, the paper might be replaced with plastic, metal (still in use 
for money), tattoos, distinctive and picturesque signs of all sorts, or simply re-
cordings on a computer or a mobile phone. To solve a riddle, one must first of 
all understand the terms involved. Thus, in order to figure out what grounds 
constitutive rules, I will highlight their dependence on recordings and docu-
ments. I will do so by analysing two possible conceptions of social reality, which 
I will call the Manifest Image and the Deep Image, respectively.  
 
2. Manifest Image 
“Manifest Image” does not mean “false image. In fact, it is tempting to see soci-
ety and its objects, including money, as the outcome of our intentionality (mon-
ey has value because we think it does, laws apply because we think they do). 
From this perspective, the most direct and intuitive way to explain the function-
ing of money and social reality as a whole is intentionalism, whose most illus-
trious interpreter is indeed John Searle.1 For Searle, the constitutive rule of so-
cial objects is “X counts as Y in C”: X (the physical object, e.g. a piece of paper) 
counts as Y (social object, e.g. a banknote) in context C, because of collective in-
tentionality. That is what I will call the Manifest image. Searle’s intentionalist 
perspective has a twofold structure. Its first element is the claim that social reali-
 
1 Searle 1995 and 2010.  
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ty is constructed by us. In fact, when one reflects on our relationship with mon-
ey, titles, works of art, etc., one might feel that these objects are socially what 
they are because we collectively decide that they are, indeed, money, titles, 
works of art. The second element is the thesis that this “us” manifests itself as 
collective intentionality (a close relative of Rousseau’s general will, of Montes-
quieu’s spirit of the laws, and, after all, of the spirit in the Christian and Hegeli-
an sense). In this sense, the manifest image may meet some fundamental intui-
tions. For instance, when we pay, we may have the impression that both us and 
the recipients of our money share the conviction that money has value because 
we believe so. 
However, the manifest image leaves a few things unexplained. First of all, 
it is unclear what is meant by “collective intentionality”: a vague notion that 
seems to not only cover obvious cases of sharing actions (“how about we take a 
walk?” “let’s have a coffee”) but also chimerical constructs like the general will. 
It is also unclear what its spatial-temporal location would be, provided there is 
one. Instead, it is very clear what individual intentionality may be—something 
that can be shared and coordinated with others on the basis of a document. All 
in all, collective intentionality is but a legal and philosophical fiction compara-
ble to the generalizability test of the Kantian moral imperative: when the court 
issues a ruling “in the name of the Italian people” it is acting as the representa-
tive of a collective intentionality? Of course not: it simply means that the deci-
sion is not arbitrary, and is taken in compliance with the law. Likewise, expres-
sions such as “the Court ruled” do not express collective intentionality, but 
simply a decision (taken by majority or unanimously), that is, the numerical 
predominance of individual intentions. 
Secondly, the intentionalist perspective does not account for negative enti-
ties, such as debts—it is difficult to find a physical X corresponding to the nega-
tive social Y.2 The same difficulty applies to electronic money. If I pay with my 
cell phone, is the physical X the phone? If it is then the same object has two 
prices: a sales price and a variable price, which manifests itself through its pur-
chasing potential, which could hardly be considered a property of the phone as a 
physical X.  
Finally, collective intentionality interprets society in terms of harmony and 
consensus rather than in terms of conflict, disagreement, contradiction: and yet 
the latter is the way in which social reality has always appeared to us, from the 
Iliad to today. Society, as well as normativity (laws, obligations, institutions, 
rules, prohibitions), does manifest itself not only in consensus but also in con-
flict. Indeed, norms are mainly perceived when they are in conflict with our in-
stincts and our immediate dispositions, clashing with what we would like to do. 
And collective intentionality only explains some situations in which normativity 
is weak: a walk or a picnic, not a board of directors, a high command or a court. 
The same sharing of collective intentions that seems to unite the members of a 
football team or the musicians of an orchestra is the result of a document-based 
normativity: in the first case the coach presenting the game schemes and the 
constraints imposed by the rules of football, in the second the director (whose 
presence would be completely useless, like that of coaches and generals, if there 
really was collective intentionality) and the sheet music. 
 
2 Searle and Smith 2003. 
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It is not surprising that the manifest image should face the same difficulties 
as the social contract in politics, and as dualism in the theory of the mind. These 
difficulties become particularly notable in the case of money, whose structure 
would be divided into a spiritual part that is in us (the value attributed to mon-
ey), and into a material and accidental part that is outside of us. Intentionality 
would be acting as a collective pineal gland, called to link the immaterial (the 
value, the social object) with the material (the piece of paper, the physical ob-
ject). In short, the manifest image undoubtedly explains certain social acts—
there is no question that a parliament constructs something when promulgating 
a law (even though it is worth noting that the form of the law and its context are 
already there, and therefore it isn’t an absolute construction). However, this in-
tentionalist explanation, if applied to the whole social reality, seems to be no 
less mythological than an explanation of morality for which the ten command-
ments are actually the manifestation of God’s will to Moses.  
In fact, there are many empirical circumstances disproving the intentional-
ist explanation. First, the obvious difficulty that it is impossible to determine 
when and how the “invention” of money actually took place. Secondly, the 
even greater difficulty of clarifying the nature of collective intentionality, which 
carries the burden of proof. Thirdly, and most importantly, the intentionalist ex-
planation makes money a fragile invention which could be rejected at any time 
by the mere end of consensus. But, in fact, this is false. The reduction (not dis-
appearance) of monetization in the Middle Ages was not the result of consensu-
al agreement, but depended on the rarity of coins, which were no longer able to 
cover the amount of real exchanges. Also, the enemy’s money is still valid in 
times of war (as Wittgenstein’s father well knew, investing his capital in the ti-
tles of the Entente).  
Also, whatever collective intentionality wants, or does not want—and pro-
vided such a unitary feeling exists—when a state prints too many banknotes 
people do not become richer (as they should if the value of money depended on 
collective intentionality) but poorer, and money loses value. Indeed, although 
everyone agrees that 1,000 marks is a lot of money, why is it that they can sud-
denly be worth nothing, and one has to switch to banknotes like 100,000, or 
1,000,000? It would seem that we are dealing with a collectively masochistic in-
tentionality, rather than with a collective intentionality. Lastly, if collective in-
tentionality determined the value of money, it would be impossible to explain 
phenomena such as financial crises. Neither the latter nor natural phenomena 
can be controlled. Yet, there is a single and significant difference, which relates 
to the their different deep structure: namely, that the disappearance of collective 
memory and documents would put an end—albeit dramatically, meaning the 
end of civilization—to a financial crisis, but it would not be able to stop the rain, 
nor to question the law of gravitation. 
 
3. Deep Structure 
To move to the deep structure, I invite you to act like the fool of the famous 
Chinese proverb: do not look at the moon, but at your finger. In this case, do 
not look at the mind and the wonderful representations it contains, let alone at 
collective intentionality (provided you can find it), but rather look at the notes 
you have in your wallet or the change tinkling in your pocket. It is worth noting 
that in Searle’s intentionalist formulation of the constitutive rule, “counts as” 
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can easily be translated into “stands for,” which is the character of the symbolic 
relationship. From this perspective, social objects created in this way are all 
symbols, but of what? Of the Fort Knox Gold? Of course not. Of the ideas you 
have in your head? Neither, as you can have a lot of money but a few ideas, and 
vice versa. Of what, then? What if they were not symbols, but real objects, that, 
far from representing states of mind, are actually able to produce them? 
There are two main theses following from the idea of the deep structure. 
The first is that collective intentionality does not exist; instead, there is an often-
conflicting social interaction that is made possible by the use of documents (both 
in the strict and in the broad sense: institutions, rituals, transmitted behaviours) 
that coordinate individual actions and intentions. The second is that money ex-
erts its prestige on individual intentions without any intervention of collective 
intentionality—for the very good reason that a non-existent entity has no causal 
value—and based on the sole force of what I call “documentality”.3 By this term 
I do not mean the sphere of the intentions that exist in our mind, but that of so-
cial recordings, from the promise onwards, which exist both out of our minds—
in archives, wallets, cell phones—and in them, but as external elements: think, for 
example, of our memory of a word given, which is no longer entirely ours (unlike 
what happens to so many other thoughts that belong to us and only to us). 
The documentalist explanation—that is, the deep structure—is structured in 
two theses: the first is that documentality is the necessary condition of social re-
ality, which cannot exist without documents; the second is that documentality is 
the sufficient condition of social reality: if there are documents, along with be-
ings biologically identical to us (in particular, endowed with sensibility and 
memory), there is everything that makes up social reality, including individual 
and collective intentionality. The documentalist explanation, just like the inten-
tionalist one, depends on the theory of speech acts4: there are acts that do not 
just describe or prescribe, but actually construct objects: a marriage, a debt, a 
holiday, a war. Only, instead of taking the consistency of the act (its ontological 
status) to depend on the physical objects that are transformed into social objects, 
it posits that the transformation of the act into an object depends on recording, 
according to the formula: Object = Recorded Act. The social object is the result of 
a social act (involving at least two people, or a person and a delegated machine) 
that has the characteristic of being recorded—thereby acquiring the permanence 
typical of objectivity—on any physical medium. This, among other things, easi-
ly accounts for negative entities: debts are noted in the column of giving, just as 
credits are in the column of having.  
The crucial role of recording is very clear in the case of money. I have a 
note in my hand, and I can pay the bill at the restaurant. I can do so also with a 
debit card, with a cell phone, or photographing a barcode on the bill. What do 
these operations have in common? The fact that there are recordings—analogue 
or digital codes on my account, analogue or digital memories in my pockets—
like paper tickets, plastic cards, or even a phone, which can do a lot of things 
precisely because it has a lot of memory, which results in a great computational 
capacity. So, money is a form of recording. In fact, all money can be traced back 
to this origin and function—and anything that can accomplish this function can 
act as money. There is no change in terms of the nature of money occurring be-
 
3 Cf. Ferraris 2005, 2009, 2014. 
4 Austin 1962. 
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tween a note, a card and pure memory: what occurs is rather a revelation of 
what money really is, namely the recording of a numerical value that, through 
recording itself, acquires economic value. Certainly, to be a valid recording has 
to reflect the economic value of the merchandise transferred or service rendered, 
not just any arbitrary recording. Yet, this just shows that a recording cannot func-
tion on its own. Rather, it needs to be included into a wider network of record-
ings, including those in people’s minds (cf. Terrone 2014a, 2014b).  
If we understand that the essence of money is recording (according to the 
rule Object = Recorded Act, which is particularly clear with banknotes, where 
the act is a relation between the central bank and the anonymous holder of the 
money), we can also understand why, before banknotes, people used coins (per-
haps of gold, a material that does not rust), or shells, or salt sacks: all discrete 
portions that can be counted, generating an archive; that can be subdivided, fa-
cilitating payments; that can be kept in a limited space (for this reason only, by 
the way, coins are better than salt bags). This shows that the constitutive rule 
that makes money what it is requires much more than collective intentionality. 
In fact, constitutive rules require a background of empirical conditions, which 
come from the role that recording plays in the production of these rules. Consti-
tutive rules are not just a matter of intentionality but also—indeed, first of all—a 
matter of matter. In this sense, the power behind money, recording (the genetic 
principle of the form), is the principle underlying social normativity as a whole. 
According to what we have just said, documentality is the principle of responsi-
bility, which in turn originates normativity—indeed, and more exactly, it is 
what Montaigne and Pascal called “the mystical foundation of authority”. In 
this sense, the essence of money is manifested in the bitcoin, and retrospectively 
the bitcoin makes the value of the gold coin, of gold, and of salt real. The digital 
currency, in fact, is nothing but the memory trace of a transaction, a pure doc-
ument that has no external rooting, if not a secure and public record (the block-
chain) that registers the transaction and acts as its guarantor.  
This, like other empirical facts, proves the validity of documentalism. Soci-
ety cannot do without inscriptions and recordings, archives and documents, and 
without the arche-technology of writing, which is the prototypical form of re-
cording. Moreover, without recording there would not and could not be legal 
institutions, obligations, guarantees and rights. So, justice would never have 
been fully realized, as it is intrinsically social. Documents do not only act as 
regulators in the economy and in the legal sphere, but are the producers of val-
ues, norms, cultures, conflicts, up to determining (through education and imita-
tion) individual intentionality and allowing (through sharing) for collective in-
tentionality. Despite appearances, it is the document that creates the value, not 
the value that produces the document: gold is not worth it because it is gold, but 
because it has characteristics (the same ones that make it a useful metal in jewel-
lery) that make it a durable and malleable document medium. Documents, in 
this sense, are the cornerstone of the empirical background of constitutive rules. 
 
4. Pentecost or Emergence 
The contraposition between intentionalism and documentalism implies a meta-
physical problem. Considering (collective and individual) intentionality as a 
primitive leads us to embrace what I call “Pentecostal meaning”: that is, postu-
lating the existence of a meaning previous to and independent of the forms in 
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which it is expressed and of the ways in which it is imprinted—that is, the psy-
chological and social equivalent of Cartesian dualism. This view involves pat-
tern of this kind: in the mind there are meanings that are expressed through 
words, which in turn are represented in writing. So, meaning might exist even if 
unexpressed, and, most importantly, meaning has no genesis: it has always ex-
isted or has fallen from the sky. This model is found in most theories of man 
and of society. For instance, it is often postulated that there is an in-itself, hu-
man nature, which is alienated by external conditions, usually associated with 
technology, and which must be restored through a return to human nature as it 
really and naturally is. In such a theory of society, the origin of the social world 
is placed precisely in collective intentionality, which manifests itself through a 
contract from which society originates. 
Indeed, from the intentionalist perspective, money and its normative power 
are a variation of the social contract: it is agreed to give value to a piece of pa-
per, or gold, a shell or a salt sack, just as it is agreed to regulate society in a cer-
tain way. The counterpart of this approach, in theory of the mind, is the postu-
late of a res cogitans, distinct and independent from the res extensa. All of this is 
based on a precise topology: meaning, spirit, idea, and consciousness are inside; 
signifier, letter, expression, and action are outside. Conversely, the documental-
ist explanation calls for an emerging meaning (meaning comes from act and re-
cording) instead of a Pentecostal one (meaning precedes act and recording). If 
Pentecostal meaning is conceived as independent and anterior to expression and 
recording, emergent meaning, on the contrary, recognizes its dependence on 
both, and proposes a Copernican revolution that consists in overturning the tra-
ditional structure and conceiving intentionality (the spirit, the idea, the will, and 
the purpose) as successive and derivative, rather than as prior and foundational, 
compared to the forms of fixation (the letter, the expression, the norm). More 
radically, the deep structure shows that documentality is a condition of intentionali-
ty. Surely, written symbols need minds in order to acquire meaning, but minds 
themselves require some forms of fixation, which in the contemporary debate in 
cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind have been characterized in terms 
of mental files (cf. Recanati 2012 and Terrone 2017 for an application to social 
ontology). From this perspective, the claim that intentionality requires docu-
mentality can interpreted as the claim that intentionality requires the deploy-
ment of mental files, which are the mental counterparts of documents. 
This change of perspective overcomes the difficulties raised by the manifest 
image, and in particular it answers the question why, if social reality is con-
structed, it is so difficult to change it. The answer is precisely that the manifest 
image hides an essential point: the fact that social objects are constructed does not 
mean that social reality is constructed. Like money, society is not constructed, but 
emerges. Above all, society is not just a human fact.5 Society is not simply com-
posed of humans, but includes dimensions other than human (animals, for ex-
ample), or superhuman (myths, which are constitutive elements of the social 
world). Such dimensions are the structures that make us human. If it is difficult 
to imagine non-human animals investing in the stock market (but not exchang-
ing banknotes!), it is even more difficult to imagine that our forms of social or-
ganization (dominance structures, elementary kinship relationships, taboos) 
have no relation of continuity with our animal past. Likewise, it is difficult to 
 
5 For a criticism of anthropocentric social ontology cf. Epstein 2015. 
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imagine a human social activity that would not be decisively conditioned by its 
technical forms of realization. And recording, as I have argued above, is the 
most basic technical form of realization that grounds social reality.  
So, money, very simply, is a document like any other: it’s like a passport, 
for example, and shares its complicated decorations and characteristic colours 
(blue for Americans, red for Europeans, green for Arabs, as far as passports are 
concerned, that is). With a passport a state authorizes a citizen to expatriate (so 
it was originally) and with a banknote it authorizes her to buy. Since the citizens 
who want to buy are far more numerous than those who want to expatriate, 
there are more banknotes than passports. And since money goes from hand to 
hand, banknotes are “on bearer”, as exchanges are made quickly, and possibly 
by illiterate people—in most countries (albeit with the significant exception of 
the United States) banknotes have different size and colour, so that money could 
be defined as the documents of those who cannot read. Here is another im-
portant sense in which documentality contributes to the empirical background 
of constitutive rules, as far as the rule that turns a piece of paper into money ex-
ploits the empirical features of this very piece of paper. In addition, both with 
passports and with banknotes, the state does not invent anything new, but mere-
ly gives a paper form to ways of fixating acts and quantifying value that origi-
nated in our animal past and whose evolution coincides with the evolution of 
human cultures. 
Ultimately, if one focuses on the Manifest image of social reality, one may 
have the impression that collective intentionality is almost almighty as far as it 
can create social objects at will by simply stating the corresponding constitutive 
rules. Yet, if one shifts one’s attention onto the Deep image, as I have tried to do 
in this paper, one can acknowledge that the creation of social objects through 
constitutive rules has much deeper roots, which on closer inspection reveal to be 
documents and recordings.  
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